Chapter 14: Embracing the Shadow: Recognizing Liminality in Dangarembga’s Jungian Undercurrents

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The interview between Tsitsi Dangarembga and Jane Wilkinson in 1989, published in 1992, carries greater significance than has been accounted for. It is here that all questions asked relating to the act of writing as “rewriting,” remembering and forgetting, the difficulty of the interface between fact and fiction, and the viability of norms and values, especially in terms of the family constellation, are related to Carl Gustav Jung’s archetypes of the soul. When asked about the distinction drawn between fairy tale and romantic stories on the one hand and reality and history on the other, Dangarembga says: “...at the end of the
day it’s like this Jungian idea of embracing the shadow, isn’t it? I mean, where you have fact you have fiction as well and sometimes the interface is difficult” (Wilkinson 191). The clear line of divide between binaries disappears in the conditions of anomic that characterize the situation of colonization and decolonization. Writing becomes the rewriting of history from an ambivalent space. Like Homi K. Bhabha—elsewhere, Helen Tiffin states that “[p]ostcolonial cultures are inevitably hybridized, involving a dialectical relationship between European ontology and epistemology and the impulse to create or recreate independent local identity” (95).

What is at stake in Dangarembga’s Nervous Conditions, is the sustainability of silencing women within the family as well as other ways of “othering” them. Nyasha’s voyage into English modernity, for instance, challenges the privileged discourses of Shona society. Similarly, Tambudzai finds it necessary to adapt to these patriarchal discourses while at the same time exploring the possibilities offered by “Englishness.” Tambudzai’s agency exists in an interstitial space structured by ambivalence. For Dangarembga, “We need another set of norms . . . to rethink all these norms and values and customs both traditional and Western” (Wilkinson 194). Accordingly, she responds to the comment on the success of the wedding: “the fact that the wedding was a success makes an important point in that again it’s a question of embracing the shadow . . .” (194).

To embrace the shadow is to embrace the colonizer and the colonial edict. This act, however, requires a defiance of what Jung calls the moral complex. I argue here that the moral complex represents the discourse of cultural difference. This is crucial because it is Jung who refers to the two important sources of the shadow complex as cultural indoctrination and familial repression (Stevens 48). The discourse of cultural difference discriminates against women and “the Evil Stranger” (colonizer) and becomes complicated as women construct their subjectivity in relation to the discourses of the “Evil Stranger” and patriarchy. Since the
shadow is unwanted and antisocial, it is quite clear that embracing it in effect carries with it the prospect of being rejected by society.

Nyasha and Lucia are subversive in their acts, yet Nyasha’s rationality, which symptomizes her English acculturation, does not really or effectively undermine cultural discourse or the moral complex whose recognition actually depends on rationality. Tambudzai’s ability to be in a sense oblivious to the negative prospects of “Englishness” makes her “too eager to embrace the ‘Englishness’ of the mission; and after the more concentrated ‘Englishness’ of Sacred Heart” (203). Cultural indoctrination, as Jung would have it, would want the moral complex to posit “Englishness” as the archetype of the Predator or Evil Stranger. Nyasha upholds the self/other binaries that typify the discursive ontology and European epistemology that renders subjectivity as the Other: “I won’t grovel. Oh no, I won’t. I am not a good girl. I’m evil. I’m not a good girl” (200).

Nyasha’s less successful subversion stems from her ironic willingness to see men and colonizers as the Enemy or the Predator or, in short, a shadow she will not embrace. In so doing, she unwittingly exercises her subjectivity under and within the tyranny of binary oppositions. Her experience of familial repression, of seeing her mother and Ma’Shingayi living for their husbands and Maiguru’s education not being enough for her emancipation, cause her total rejection of males in general. At the peril of reinforcing the false distinctions between masculine and feminine, Nyasha regrets her mother’s pandering tendency towards males, even when she (Maiguru) had left Babamukuru to spend some time with her brother and his family: “Nyasha was unhappy that Maiguru had gone to her brother. ‘A man! She always runs to men,’ she despaired. ‘There’s no hope, Tambu. Really, there isn’t.’ Nor did she want her mother to come back soon. It was difficult to say whether she wanted her to come back at all” (175). Tambudzai, however, responds to historical necessity and the question of survival or what Jung earlier on called the principle of adaptation. Tambudzai’s personality has to undergo changes—convenient enough to assume her persona as “the grateful poor female relative.” Carl Gustav Jung
is quoted as saying, "[o]ne could say, with little exaggeration, that the persona is that which in reality one is not, but which oneself as well as others think one is" (qtd. in Stevens 47). This explains why Tambudzai is aware that, in her own words, "I was not the person I was expected to be" (Dangarembga 110). According to Stevens, “through the persona we codify ourselves in a form which we hope will prove acceptable to others. It has sometimes been referred to as the social archetype or the conformity archetype, for on it depends the success or failure of one’s adaptation to society” (47). It is interesting that the “self” is not effaced but under erasure. As distinct from its Freudian appropriation, in Jung’s use, “the self” means “the center of consciousness and what we refer to when we use the terms ‘I’ or ‘me’” (Stevens 45). Its function is to defend consciousness against unwanted contents arising from the unconscious through repression, denial, projection, and rationalization. To quote Tambudzai: “But in those days it was easy for me to leave tangled thoughts knotted, their loose ends hanging. I didn’t want to explore the treacherous mazes that such thoughts led into. I didn’t want to reach the end of those mazes, because there, I know, I would find myself and I was afraid I would not recognize myself after taking so many directions” (Dangarembga 116). Tambudzai represses the contents of the unconscious in such a manner as to repress the thought that, she suspects, would lead to premature conflict and sabotage her long-term goal of wholeness and emancipation. When she assumes her persona it is because of the rationalization of ego defense. This in itself indicates that Tambudzai’s self-fashioning is ambivalent. In this sense the “I” or “me” that for Jung constitutes the center of consciousness allows the self to exist with the possibility of assuming different personas in order that self may survive. In a different context, Bhabha sees this assumption of a persona as mimicry. In Tambudzai’s case, she wants to be “selfed” through education; she wants to be like Babamukuru who had “[p]lenty of power. Plenty of money. A lot of education. Plenty of everything” (50).

Tambudzai’s acquisition of education is an act of self-em-
powerment. For education, albeit negatively mobilized against women by Babamukuru, is important for the proper exercise of women’s subjectivity. To embrace it is therefore an act of “embracing the shadow.” As in the case of Maiguru, acquiring that education involves assuming a persona that will be convenient for emancipation. Despite Babamukuru’s authoritative and domineering tendencies with regard to women, Tambu “felt secure at the mission under Babamukuru’s shadow and [she] could not understand why Nyasha found it so threatening” (116). She faces a situation of historical necessities whereby she also has to negotiate the colonial discourse synonymous with the “Englishness” of education. She also has to negotiate the patriarchal discourse that makes possible the alienating circumstances of social marginality because she is already implicated in it as a daughter of Babamukuru’s brother. The shadow complex that arises from familial repression also offers possibilities since, projecting herself as the “grateful poor relative”, Tambudzai cannot be totally seen as an objectivized other. Once embraced, the shadow can be instrumental for the woman who leads her life as the in-between figure. As such, she cannot have a fixed identity but evinces positive alterity and becomes what Sally McWilliams calls “a composite of shifting selves” (105). At one moment she has to be the obedient niece and at another a cousin who sympathizes with Nyasha’s assertiveness, and yet disapprove of Babamukuru’s treatment of Nyasha while distancing herself from Nyasha’s unstrategic rebelliousness. “Embracing the shadow” allows Tambudzai considerable purchase on the simultaneous subversion of cultural indoctrination and familial repression through the exploration of the pathologies of a traditional discourse that clashes and melds with modernity.

To embrace the shadow in this case is to exercise agency in a liminal space. It is Dangarembga who, as we discussed earlier, insists on the interface between fact and fiction or, put differently, between binarisms, being difficult (Wilkinson 191). If where there is fact there is fiction, the women of whom she speaks throughout the novel will have to negotiate the split forms of familial repres-
sion, instead of falling victim to the tyranny of binaries reified by treating men such as Babamukuru as the Enemy or Predator. Having both Predator and provider, fact and fiction, in the same space not only deflates binarisms but also suggests mimicry. As earlier discussed, mimicry is involved in the situation of “embracing the shadow,” which indicates the possibility exists for inscribing heterogeneity within an opposition so as to displace it. Tambudzai acts out Babamukuru, by way of exchanging positions with him so that she will have empowerment and simultaneously disempower him. She subverts and mocks the binary structure of male/female by repeating Babamukuru, dislocating him fractionally through mimicry in the interstice where splits are continuously negotiated, becoming Self and Other or existing as both gives us a clear sense of the ambivalent self-fashioning that is instrumental for meaningful survival. Acquiring whatever “education” Babamukuru has signifies progress.

Yet Sue Thomas thinks of power, education and money as functioning to “sustain the spell of Englishness over [Babamukuru] and the myth that an English education represents progress” (28), emphasizing only the price to be paid in the course of acquiring education. Of course, education has fashioned Babamukuru into “a good boy, a good munt. A bloody good kaffir” (200) who has to use that English education to give Nyasha and Chido a glimpse of the English values that influence Nyasha’s desire to resist traditional patriarchal discourse. As a result of the selfsame education, Nyasha is able to be sufficiently critical about history, consciousness, and colonialism which, if she had not been to England, would not have been possible. Besides, the interest that she has in traditional history of the Shona as well as the “old ways” (147) bears testimony to her embracing of the very culture that inscribes her position as inferior to men on the basis of gender.

One of the greatest dangers of the argument such as Thomas’s, which singles out progress as if it is enunciated in the manner in which the colonial edict articulates it, is its
unproblematised critique of the notion of progress. Granted, Babamukuru becomes a much more patriarchal authority who effectively silences his wife regardless of her education, but it is not difficult to recognize throughout Dangarembga’s novel a refusal to render Babamukuru, education, Whites, and colonialism as stable categories that can be neatly mapped onto the “either/or” scheme of binaries. Besides, in *Nervous Conditions* education, the West, and its discourse of progress create what is known as an environment of “trust” (Giddens 102). For, in the absence of alternatives, investing in rational constructs is better than operating outside the discourse of equality and emancipation. Thomas does not recognize value in the liminality of colonization and decolonization, the interstitial space of the subject of cultural discourse. Nor does she appreciate that progress is not only to “self” women, or that “selfing” is not moving from the margins to the center. It is also a process that is represented in what Bhabha calls a “specific, problematic kind of temporality . . . peculiarly split and doubled in its effective implementation” (Attwell 102). Englishness is therefore not some spell cast on a docile colonial subject who is willing to encounter and be subdued by myths of progress only to later uphold them: liminality’s possibilities of mimicry may repeat the myth of associating English education with progress into real progress.

Indeed, if where there is fact there is fiction (in Jungian terms), that myth of which Thomas speaks can be exchanged with factual progress through the exchange of hybridity as well as through parodic doubling. The edicts of English education and language, as well as an external notion of progress, are not imposed on passive colonial subjects, particularly where there is a specific problematic of temporality at work. Since we own that the colonial subject is not passive but finds agency in the split forms of English education, the choices that Babamukuru, Maiguru, and Tambudzai make serve to demonstrate the difficult conditions under which their agency operates. Tambudzai makes a choice that will disallow or reverse the helplessness that Sue Thomas unwittingly expects and projects in her analysis. Tambudzai says that she “ban-
ished the suspicion, buried it in the depths of [her] subconscious, and happily went back to Sacred Heart” (203).

Again, let us consider this decision as it was earlier anticipated: "I did not know because I did not speak English. But, I assured him, I was going to learn English when I went back to school" (28). Tambudzai can master the discourses that constitute her, but she also has to reconfigure them. This is an act of reappropriation of English education and the language itself. This, however, requires recognition of the liminality of the position from which such a reappropriation takes place. For it is not a matter of responding directly to an Englishness that is an Enemy on the other side of the binarism: it is more a matter of reconfiguring the subject of cultural difference. This transforms the processes of reappropriation at a level that is specific while undermining whatever discourse aspires to claim a primary ontological status for itself in relation to some “othering” education or language. The reappropriation of English education or English as a language is very much a part of undermining the alterity that obtains in the specific and problematic temporality of colonization and recolonization.

As far as embracing the shadow is concerned, it is not difficult to discern that, once embraced, English education can be an enabling mode for progress in terms of its access to "re-embedding" systems such as the discourse of the liberation of women. Familial repression, the very cause of the shadow complex, engenders a lack which is eventually turned into a space for the subversion of the other source of the shadow complex, that is, cultural indoctrination. The potential for subversion is limitless because the historical situation of postcoloniality includes displacements and contradictions. This situation’s potentialities are hardly surprising given that, according to Jungian psychology, irrespective of having familial repression as its source, the shadow complex emerges “out of potentially actuality relations [and], in time, comes to structure those relations” (Brooke 17); and this in itself goes to show that for the putative other to be “selfed,” embracing the
shadow reconstitutes the particulars of family life. Examples of this are when Maiguru turns her docility into emancipatory activity; when Tambudzai disapproves of her parents’ wedding; and when Lucia recognizes her potential for agency as an unmarried woman without totally rejecting marriage.

Dangarembga is acutely aware of the vulnerability of the “dominant discourse.” This discourse, thoroughly patriarchal and coinciding with colonialism, encounters counter-hegemonic discourse in the account of a woman who will not compromise herself as she encounters conflicts that are discursively positioning femininity as a marginality. Tambudzai says, “now I began to see that the disappointing events . . . were serious consequences of the same general laws that had almost brought my education to an abrupt, predictable end . . . I did not want my life to be predicted by such improper relations. I decided I would just have to make up my mind not to let it happen” (38). Nyasha also confesses that “it’s not virtue that keeps me so busy! I think, though, that your uncle is pleased with the quieter environment and I have discovered that it is restful to have him pleased, and so these days I am doing my best not to antagonize him. You can imagine how difficult that is. Impossible, it seems” (196-97). The interstitial space is difficult but somehow uncannily necessary. Thus the view that “[t]he oppressed are victims of social injustice; their significance, however does not reside in the fact of their victimization but in the possibility that their agency will transform their fixed relations” (Hitchcock 8). That Nyasha was taken to England was not deleterious but in some ways fortunate in that she was soon to find herself in conditions of hybridity, the very conditions that give her energy, “at times stormy and turbulent, at times confidently severe, but always reaching, reaching a little further than I thought of reaching” (151-52). This is a benefit of what Bhabha in a different context describes as “a willingness to descend into that alien territory [a means for the] recognition of the split-space of enunciation [which] may open the way to conceptualizing an international culture based . . . on the inscription and articulation of culture’s hy-
for a psychic need to "make up for the lack" as unprogressive. According to them the lack that metropolitan accounts are always suggesting, is part of a disseminatory negotiation with the colonial or its shadow (106). In my mind, this disseminatory negotiation corresponds closely with hybridity. At times, Nyasha acts and speaks of herself in a tone that is nothing short of regret, but Dangarembga hails the condition that Nyasha laments. Nyasha describes her situation thus: "We shouldn’t have gone. . . . They should have [packed us off home]. Lots of people did that. Maybe that would have been best. For them at least, because now they’re stuck with hybrids for children. And they don’t like it" (78).

Tambu on the other hand regrets and mimics. She considers it an opportunity to be hybrid and chooses the image of the "poor female relative" who depends on the mercy and patriarchal design of Babamukuru. When Tambudzai voices her dissatisfaction, it is with the intention of a strategic engagement that will involve no spectacular conflict but still salvage victory and authority: "The most I could do was ask in a small, timid voice to be allowed to stay, with Nyasha, I specified, for a few more days. Nobody was more surprised by my audacity than I was. Babamukuru did not answer, but I was not taken home. I did not take it as a victory though I took it as proof that Babamukuru was good" (199). What good is it recognizing the good of an oppressive patriarchal figure such as Babamukuru? In the order of (interstitial) things, victim and victor, related to each other in putative polarity (Brooke 17), are as much exchangeable as repeatable when splitting and doubling occur in the specific temporality of the colonial situation. Babamukuru becomes reinscribed so that parodic doubling effects a relation of alterity between women (as the same) and men (as the other). In This Sex Which Is Not One (1985) Luce Irigaray invokes a sense of mimicry whereby we have the same as that which it simulates but necessarily also different from the same, until the woman being the same mimes herself without being herself. Tambudzai mimics herself as a disempowered adolescent female without being disempowered; she stands more to benefit as
bridity” (“Difference, Discrimination” 22). As earlier pointed out, the possibilities for mimicry are legion in hybridity. Female subjectivity may be exercised positively although initially appearing to be split in a process through which they “self” themselves from what seems to be marginality. Tambudzai learns from Nyasha that “there were other directions to be taken, other struggles to engage in besides the consuming desire to emancipate [herself and her] family. Nyasha gave [her] the impression of moving, always moving and striving towards some state that she had seen and accepted a long time ago. Apprehensive as [she] was . . . [she] wanted to go with her” (152). Tambudzai’s development includes “having to cope with [Nyasha’s] experimental disposition, her insistence on alternatives, her passion for transmuting the present to the possible” (178). This experimental disposition characterizes the conditions of the problematic temporality of liminal space.

In Jungian psychology complexes such as the shadow “are not isolated entities but tend to be related to each other, particularly in polarity: for example child and mother, mother and old wise woman, woman and death, mother and father, hero and father, hero and maiden, victim and victor, or trickster and wise old woman . . . [they] tend towards conflict and resolution” (Brooke 17). Although a victim of the patriarchal discourse that constructs female subjectivity in Babamukuru’s family and a person whose radical behavior leads to her loss of appreciation for values of respect, Nyasha becomes important for Tambudzai:

Nyasha was something unique and necessary for me. I did not like to spend too long without talking to her about the things that worried me because she would, I knew, pluck out the heart of the problem with her multi-directional mind and present it to me in ways that made sense, but not only that, in ways that implied also that problems existed not to be worried over but to extend us in our search for solutions. (151)

Elsewhere Attwell and Bhabha describe the tendency of arguing
she takes refuge in the image of "the grateful poor female relative" (116). In other words, in terms of both Jung and Irigaray, Tambudzai repeats the patriarchal relations that she finds without actually reinforcing them.

Tambudzai finds herself in an interstitial situation at Sacred Heart where the problem is not really one of identity but of inferiorization and a production of lack through the differential discourses that at the same time give Tambudzai access to the values of humanism, enlightenment, and so forth. We read that in a school in Rhodesia, a country with more Africans than Whites, the Sister remarks: "We have more Africans here than usual this year and so we had to put them all in here" (194). Tambudzai is therefore to be reduced to the Same through institutional processes of categorization. All this while we bear in mind that the Jungian Self has individuation as its raison d'être (Stevens 45). Tambudzai is not only a subject produced spectacularly in a plane of difference but finds herself "in-between," so much so that her identity is best accounted for in terms of liminality. Being in a position of in-betweensness, Tambu accrues more chances for the productive undermining, exchanging, repeating, and mimicking with a privileged self-assured presence until she can live "with and within difference" (Minh-ha Woman 84). Tambudzai, unlike Nhano, does not find it necessary to repudiate her family background as she pursues her emancipation. She lives instead in "two worlds," ensuring that she does not grow aphasic like Nhano (53) or anorexic like Nyasha when she feels the need to, in her own words, "discipline my body and occupy my mind" (197). Tambudzai suffers terribly and is forced into a position of introspection, concluding that "Babamukuru could only be so charitable to our branch of the family because [they] were so low. He was kind because of the difference" (65, emphasis added). Difference is thus used to forge a new interstitial position. For it is only in such a position that the lack of individual identity effected by the "Same-ing" of Tambudzai by the nuns can be turned into a space of emancipation.
Albert Memmi uses the term “depersonalization” for the “mark of the plural” embossed on each individual colonial subject, implying a systematic creation of an anonymous collectivity (85). This process is effectively disavowed by the individuation essential to, often concomitant with, the personal adjustment that underscores the reconciliation of opposites and tensions within the psyche of the (Jungian) Self as well as within the archetype of the shadow (Brooke 17). It therefore becomes part of the adjustment and the psychic totality of the Self that difference with regard to Europe be reconciled without losing sight of individuation. The site of the actualization and/or reconciliation is interstitial and, accordingly, the self-fashioning is ambivalent. That should better explain why Tambudzai will not be deterred by any of the alienating circumstances, saying, “. . . I was ashamed of my weakness in succumbing so flabbily to the strangeness of my new circumstances . . . I reaffirmed my vow to use the opportunity my uncle had given me to maximum advantage” (89). It is not a matter of “embracing the shadow” for her emancipation and only that: Tambudzai affirms her place in the hybridized scheme of things: “[Nyasha] was not very explicit about these consequences beyond assuring me that they would follow, and I did not push her because, in spite of the warning, I would still have liked to go to a multiracial school, and I liked the feeling of ambition and aspiration that went with this desire” (105). There are two chief points that need to be made about this passage. Tambudzai anticipates the benefit of being in a situation of difference, where her hybridity and individuation are possible. For her, embracing difference seems to be part of the subject of cultural difference. The second point follows directly from this. Her encounter with the differential discourses at the mission enables her to resist being fashioned into the knowable other, a White ontological identity. She is therefore seeing the opportunity of a liminal space, where the master narratives of the European civilizing mission are both to be embraced and commensurately tested and contested. Hence embracing the shadow is a deliberate choice.

Of key interest is that the space which is designated as the
one occupied by a “subject peoples” does not actually belong to the “subject peoples.” It is a site of objectification which is designated to make Tambudzai unhappy and desperate. Being the object of certain stereotyping and depersonalizing, there might be a misrecognition on the part of the colonial subject, invoking delusions of self-knowledge when the subjectivity of females continuously divides and splits. Yet the persona that assumes the image of an inferior other can mislead (and somehow disrupt the consciousness of) the colonizer or Shona patriarch.

Tambudzai’s quest for education is not an act of wholesale adoption of values that are dangerous for her. The colonial stereotypes show the colonizer’s incapacity to exercise the virtues of christianity/enlightenment/humanism. When Tambudzai arrives at the convent she faces inhumane and marginalizing ways of greeting, ways that underscore objectification: “At the door a nun, smiling beatifically, made us welcome by shaking our hands and asking us ‘Which one is this?’ before taking us up and down corridors to a room at the end of a long hallway” (194). Tambudzai, always determined to learn the English language, might internalize the stereotypically naturalized address of Africans as regarding her to be one amongst others that are the same. The Comaroffs explain the situation thus: “Colonizers in most places and at most times try to gain control over both the material and semantic practices through which their would-be subjects produce and reproduce the very basis of their existence” (236). If Tambudzai has all along been seeing the earlier difficulties as a result of “[f]emaleness as opposed and inferior to maleness” (116), it would make sense to forge links with other females such as Nyasha in order that they may share an identity as oppressed women. Jung’s influence on Dangarembga counters generalizing Tambudzai into Sameness by presenting her instead as the ego that emerges out of the fragments which gradually cohere. One reason why the reconfiguration of the subject of cultural discourse cannot be distanced from Jung’s archetypes is that it more or less duplicates the conditions under which differential discourses can be simultaneously embraced and
undermined through a disseminatory negotiation that renders the journey emancipatory. One might add that Tambudzai appropriates the violence of naming by categorizing the nuns, paying particular attention to their vices as well as insisting on difference in order that she may make discriminatory choices: “There were nuns to be observed and classified according to whether they were human or not, lay-teachers whose idiosyncrasies had to be identified so that you did not fall prey to them. The white students needed careful study to decide whether they were different or similar to me, whether they were likeable or not and what their habits were” (195). It is in and through such a restaging of values that her identity and individuality will be assured. Also, the agency or reconfiguration of the subject of cultural discourse is shown to necessarily involve the transposition and substitution of the subject of cultural difference, culminating in an alterity that bears testimony to what the Comaroffs designate as the “long history of symbolic struggle” (235). Tambudzai is engaged in the kind of struggle mentioned here, not only constituted but also constituting (in an ambivalent mode of self-fashioning) discursive conditions of possibility.

Tambudzai, like Lucia later, finds the mission crucial in the symbolic struggle that later culminates in the wholeness or “selfing” of women, albeit that their subjectivity has to undergo divisions that render them “unnatural” in relation to traditional and colonial discourses. “Unnaturalness” indicates the new enunciative position that emerges when mimicry turns the discursive conditions of dominance into grounds of intervention. I use “unnatural” as a term that signifies a deliberate and conscious effort by females such as Nyasha in her rebellious rantings or Tambudzai in her resistance to culture’s call (or, in fact, cultural discourse’s claim) for a woman’s subservience, or even Lucia’s forthright, confrontational character. That is to say, being unnatural is in a sense affirming the subjectivity of women. I nominate here this condition as an ironic unnaturalness, particularly because it brings to view the real unnaturalness of men. This explains why
it takes Nyasha, in a moment of ironic unnaturalness, to show the extent to which Babamukuru misrecognizes the symptoms of difficult existence in hybridizing conditions. But she understands that Babamukuru is himself a victim of what Nyasha explains to Tambudzai as a process: "The process . . . was called assimilation, and that was what was intended for the precocious few who might prove a nuisance if left to themselves, whereas the others—well really, who cared about the others? So they made a little space into which you were assimilated, an honourary space in which you could join them and they could make sure that you behaved yourself" (179). As I earlier pointed out, Nyasha does not sympathize with Maiguru; she thinks Maiguru silences herself despite her qualifications; she cautions Tambudzai of the disadvantages of being in the nun’s school. What is more striking here is her disavowal of possibilities for reconstituting the subject of cultural difference. Tambudzai recalls Nyasha’s warning: "they made a little space into which you were assimilated . . . into which you could join them and they could make sure that you behaved yourself. I would be comfortable in such a position, she remarked nastily, because look how well I had got on with Babamukuru. But, she insisted one ought not to occupy that space" (179, emphasis added). Rejecting that space, Nyasha disavows ambivalence; but that ambivalence is being staged when Tambudzai rationalizes the "Englishness" that her mother laments and resolves to affirm the subject of cultural discourse within the realities of interstitial positioning in the history of divided subjectivities. Tambudzai, then, will speak symptomatically and exercise her agency as she engages in a disseminatory negotiation with the colonial edict. Her position, like Maiguru’s later, relates more to the undecidability of a discourse whose central ambivalence reflects the historical contingencies attending interstices. Her residence in such a space is amenable to her differential representation of the liminality of cultural knowledges, ambivalent as they are in modernity. She embraces modernity and its social pathologies in order that she may re-inscribe her difference in a fashion that lends authority to her mar-
ginal articulation of her selfhood. The shadow Tambudzai embraces is thus shown not to possess the quintessential properties of the predator but rather propensities to undecidability. It is her undecidability that, according to Bhabha’s “Freedom’s Basis in the Indeterminate,” is “built into the factual processes of mutual understanding” (50).

Jung similarly speaks of the reconciliation of opposites in the quest for wholeness *qua persona*. To “embrace the shadow” is in Bhabha’s terms, a form of subversion, “founded on that uncertainty that turns the discursive conditions of dominance into the grounds of intervention” (“Signs” 173). It is this uncertainty, to which a Jungian reading of Dangarembga’s narrative alludes as it refers to the “grateful poor female relative” (116), that reveals the liminality of cultural knowledges on a differential and contingent scale.

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