Tutorial Letter 201/2/2018

Advanced indigenous law
LCP4804

Semester 2

Public, Constitutional and International law

IMPORTANT INFORMATION
This tutorial letter contains important information about your module.
## CONTENTS

1. FEEDBACK ON ASSIGNMENT 01 ................................................................. 4  
2. FEEDBACK ON ASSIGNMENTS 02 & 03 ........................................... 5  
3. FORMAT OF THE OCTOBER/ NOVEMBER EXAMINATION ...... 32
Dear Students

Read this tutorial letter carefully. It contains commentary on Assignment 01, Assignment 02 and Assignment 03 for the second semester of 2018. It further contains information on the forthcoming October/November 2018 examination. We hope that the feedback on Assignments will provide an insight into what is expected of you in the examinations. We trust that you found the assignments exciting, and that you are coping well with the workload.

The Study guide
The only Study Guide for LCP4804 is Tutorial Letter 102/2/2018 that was posted to MyUnisa at the beginning of Semester 2. It is a draft Study Guide that hopefully will be issued as a fully-fledged Study Guide at the beginning of next semester. It must be used together with the prescribed textbook, and contains most of the prescribed cases and statutes that are topical to this module. In order to understand the important issues discussed in the assignments and examination the Study Guide (Tutorial Letter 102/2/2018) is the starting point. However, cases and statutes are more important in answering assessment questions.
1. FEEDBACK ON ASSIGNMENT 01

Assignment 01 was relatively simple and should not have given you too much trouble. This was a compulsory assignment, consisting of MULTIPLE choice questions.

You had to mark either (1) (2) & (3) for each of the questions on the Unisa Mark-reading sheet. You did not have to give reasons for your answers.

The feedback on Assignment 01 follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>QUESTION</th>
<th>CORRECT ANSWER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

You must make sure that you study the cases listed in these questions so that you can discuss them in the examination, giving the legal question that was answered by the court; The decision of the court and reasons for judgment.
2. FEEDBACK ON ASSIGNMENT 02 & 03

Question 1

Examine the transformation of post-apartheid customary law of marriage

Names of the parties: Mabuza v Mbatha

Legal question: Whether a seSwati customary marriage can be valid without the observance of the ukumekeza custom?

Reasons for judgment: A properly constituted customary marriage can stand where the spouses waived the observance of the ukumekeza custom, particularly as the urban conditions are not even suitable for the performance of such a custom, which was suitable for the rural conditions of the past.

Decision of the court: The validity of the customary marriage was upheld.

Names of the parties: Mabena v Letsoalo

Legal question: Whether a customary marriage is valid where a young man, in the absence of his father, negotiated his own customary marriage, together with his prospective mother-in-law, who acted as the guardian of the prospective bride, in the absence of her husband.

Reasons for judgment: An adult and independent man is qualified to negotiate his own customary marriage, in the absence of his father; and the mother of the bride as an adult guardian of her daughter is equally qualified to negotiate the customary marriage and to accept delivery of the marriage goods, in the absence of her husband who has disintegrated the family.

Decision of the court: The validity of the customary marriage was upheld.

Names of the parties: Ngwenyama v Mayelane

Legal question: The SCA was asked whether the judgment of the High Court is valid where it held that a customary marriage concluded without seeking court approval for the section 7(6) of the RCMA application is invalid?

Reasons for judgment: The SCA held: non-observance of the section 7(6) of the RCMA provisions cannot render a customary marriage invalid as these are not requirements for validity. The validity requirements are set out in section 3 of the RCMA and were properly complied with. Non-observance of the section 7(6) of the RCMA provisions can at most render the customary marriage out of community of property.

Decision of the court: The SCA upheld the appeal.

Names of the parties: Mayelane v Ngwenyama

Legal question: In an appeal, the ConCourt was asked whether the SCA was correct in holding that non-observance of the section 7(6) of the RCMA provisions cannot
render a customary marriage invalid as these are not requirements for validity; and that the validity requirements as set out in section 3 of the RCMA had been properly complied with?

**Reasons for judgment:** The ConCourt endorsed the SCA’s decision that the non-observance of the section 7(6) of the RCMA provisions cannot render a customary marriage invalid as these are not requirements for validity.

**Decision of the court:** The ConCourt dismissed the appeal and confirmed the decision of the SCA.

**Further legal question:** The ConCourt was further asked whether the High Court was entitled to leave unanswered the claim of the appellant that the further customary marriage of her husband and respondent was invalid because her consent as the first wife had not been obtained when the marriage was contracted?

**Reasons for judgment:** The ConCourt found that the views of the community were conflicting: some witnesses saying the consent of the first wife was a requirement; whilst others said she merely needs to be informed about the further customary marriage. The ConCourt decided to develop the Tsonga customary law, in line with the values of equality and human dignity, to include the requirement that the consent of the first wife needs to be obtained before a further marriage of her husband and another woman can be contracted.

**Decision of the court:** The ConCourt held that since the consent of the first wife was not obtained the further customary marriage between her husband and respondent was invalid, and set it aside.
Question 2

Examine the transformation of post-apartheid customary law of succession

**Names of the parties: Bhe v Magistrate Khayelitsha**

**Legal question:** The ConCourt was asked to confirm a Western Cape High Court decision together with a North Gauteng High Court decision both of which had declared the male primogeniture rule which preferred senior males in the customary law of intestate succession unconstitutional and set it aside.

**Reasons for judgment:** The ConCourt confirmed both judgments; declared the male primogeniture rule unconstitutional for violating the equality and the human dignity clauses of the Constitution; set aside section 23 of the BAA and section 1(4) of the Intestate Succession Act. The Intestate Succession Act was imported to customary law, to distribute equal child portions to all the widows, descendants of the deceased, male and female, legitimate and illegitimate.

**Decision of the court:** Both decisions from the High Courts were confirmed.

**Names of the parties: Shilubana v Nwamitwa**

**Legal question:** On appeal from the SCA, the ConCourt was asked whether the High Court and the SCA were correct in holding that a woman could not be appointed as a traditional leader in terms of the laws and traditions of Valoyi community; and whether the Valoyi Traditional Authority had the competence to change their customary law to provide for the appointment of a woman as a traditional leader.

**Reasons for judgment:** The ConCourt answered the first question in the negative holding that in fact the Valoyi Traditional Authority had the competence to appoint a woman as a traditional leader since men and women are equal under the Constitution; and answered the second question in the affirmative, holding that section 211(2) of the Constitution empowers traditional authorities to make, repeal or amend their laws to bring them in line with the Constitution.

**Decision of the court:** The ConCourt upheld the appeal.

Question 3

**Names of the parties: Alexkor v Richersveld Community**

**Legal question:** The ConCourt was asked whether the claim of indigenous people to their title on indigenous land endures and remains valid after the land had been placed under corporate ownership by a colonial statute; and whether indigenous law should continue being viewed through the lens of the common law.

**Reasons for judgment:** Indigenous people retain their indigenous title over indigenous land and colonial legislation cannot extinguish that title. The rights of indigenous people over their land must be determined with reference to indigenous law; not common law. Indigenous law is recognised by the Constitution as
a distinct legal system which should be viewed with its own lens, not that of the common law.

**Decision of the court:** The indigenous title of the Richersveld Community over their indigenous land was confirmed and the appeal by Alexkor was dismissed.

**Names of the parties: Pilane v Pilane**

**Legal question:** The ConCourt was asked whether the High Court interdicts against the efforts of a traditional secessionist group denying them their rights to hold meetings to discuss their planned secession from the main traditional authority.

**Reasons for judgment:** The ConCourt held that the interdicts were unlawfully issued as the traditional secessionist group had the constitutional right to freedom of expression and to assemble under the Constitution.

**Decision of the court:** The appeal by the traditional secessionist group was upheld and the interdicts were set aside.

**Question 4**

A brief discussion of one of the following indigenous law institution: *isondlo, ukungena, ukwethula, ukufakwa*, followed by the application of the attributes of *Ubuntu*. See Textbook pages 188-194.

In *isondlo* a family brings up a child of another who had no means of survival on its own. The child grows up like all other children as if her parents had the means to bring it up. Once grown up the biological family regain their guardianship by delivering a cow as a gesture of gratitude. *Ubuntu* is manifested in the following attributes as reflected in the *ukufakwa* institution below: communal living, group solidarity, responsibility, accountability, generosity, shared belonging, the ethos of co-operation, and the ethic of reciprocity. As in the case of *ukufakwa*, apply these attributes on *isondlo*.

In *ukungena* the family of a deceased husband appoints a male relative from among the deceased's brothers/cousins to take over the latter’s duties of caring for the widow and assisting her to bear more children for the deceased. The widow and her children continue to experience normal life as if the deceased was still alive because the void created by his death has been filled. *Ubuntu* is manifested in the following attributes as reflected in the *ukufakwa* institution below: communal living, group solidarity, responsibility, accountability, generosity, shared belonging, the ethos of co-operation, and the ethic of reciprocity. As in the case of *ukufakwa*, apply these attributes on *ukungena*.

In *ukwethula* a husband obtains a loan from his senior house with which to establish a minor house. The loan is repaid once the daughter to be born from the minor house gets married and marriage are received. To the extent of the amount of the loan, such marriage goes are used to repay the loan to the senior house. *Ubuntu* is manifested in the following attributes as reflected in the *ukufakwa* institution below: communal living, group solidarity, responsibility, accountability, generosity, shared belonging, the
ethos of co-operation, and the ethic of reciprocity. As in the case of ukufakwa, apply these attributes on ukwethula.

In ukufakwa a relative of the father of a young woman assists the woman by acting as her father in providing for the necessaries required for her maidenly ceremonies eg intonjane, umemulo etc. The relative covers all the expenses that would normally have been covered by the father so that the maiden is in the same position as other maidens in the community. The relative recovers his expenses from the maiden’s marriage goods eg ikhazi, lobolo, should there be any. If no marriage goods are received, the expenses are never recovered. The relative also shares in the “nothing received”. Ubuntu is manifested in communal living, group solidarity, responsibility, accountability, generosity, shared belonging, the ethos of co-operation, and the ethic of reciprocity. The operation of these attributes can be explained as follows:

Ukufakwa entails a situation where a relative of a woman’s father, namely, brother, uncle, cousin, nephew, you name it, takes the responsibilities of the father and ensures that the customary traditions and ceremonies related to the initiation and/or marriage of the father’s daughter are carried out as if the relative himself was the father. This entitles the relative to a pro rata portion of the value of the lobolo goods expected from the marriage goods deliverable when the daughter gets married, or received as fines imposed as a result of delicts committed on that daughter.

The relative thereby gets entitled to such portion as of right, directly from its source (that is, as the goods are identified for delivery as lobolo goods the relevant portion already at that stage, belongs to the relative. This is to say, that portion never starts belonging to the father from the beginning and the father does not have access to it. To the extent of this portion, the relative becomes the father of the daughter in his own right. He does not have to claim the portion from the property of the father since it already belongs to him.

That is why if such goods are never delivered for whatever reason the relative does not have a claim against the father. He was never going to receive the goods from the father anyway. In such a case the relative also suffers his share of the ‘nothing received’. However, the relative remains entitled to the portion if the goods are eventually received from the marriage goods of any subsequent daughter even if he never contributed to the ceremonies of the latter.

The attributes of ubuntu as found in ukufakwa include the following:

Communal living is revealed in that relatives are a family and members of one home. They share the joys of unity as well as the pains that go with it. Nobody’s nakedness should be exposed. In the same vain, no one should be enriched at the expense of another. This is our home, and the young woman is our child. We must bring them up together for our collective betterment.

Shared sense of belonging is also revealed. No one belongs alone, nor does anyone enjoy wealth alone or suffer poverty alone. Umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu/motho ke motho ka batho - a human being derives his/her humanity from other humans. Life is
shared. No child must suffer because of the condition of their parents, but must experience the same upbringing as other children. Brotherhood is about sharing both your prosperity and your misery as family members so that the young woman can succeed.

**Group solidarity**: Your brother’s problem is your problem. His shame is your shame. If he fails and gets despised, you are also associated with that failure. If your brother’s daughter gets disgraced at her marriage home for falling short of what was expected, her father and his relatives get disgraced more. If she is Ms Khumalo, all her relatives are Khumalo. Nobody can afford to let that name go down. An injury to one Khumalo is an injury to all Khumalos. The strength of that unity lies in their ability to convert their misery to prosperity. Together the Khumalos must succeed in lifting the young woman to success.

**Reciprocity.** The good that you do will be done to you (*izandla ziyahlambana* – the hands wash each other). There is no permanent loss. What is paid out will be paid back. One hand washes the other. Nobody should be reluctant to help others because the others will also be pleased to reciprocate in future. A good deed is an investment. When you assist the niece it looks like you are losing, but when you receive the goods later the favour is returned. Ubuntu requires you to help your sister’s child to success. It also requires such a child to assist you in old age. That is why the relative does not have to be paid where there are no goods.

**Collective ownership of assets.** Brothers belong to a home which is the real owner of their productive activities. This is a Khumalo home to whose growth and development all the Khumalos can and must contribute. After all, one Khumalo’s cattle, are in fact, the cattle of all the Khumalos. All Khumalos claim: ‘these are our cattle’ (*zinkomo zakuthi ezi*). The cattle are a collective Khumalo fund. What I pay out is paid out from the Khumalos’ fund (albeit administered by me), and what I receive is received by me into the Khumalos’ fund. Our individual and collective efforts are directed at upholding this name, which is who we all are. The daughter’s ceremonies are still financed by the Khumalo home, regardless of the particular individual who is the father or his brother.

This list is not exhaustive. You may also add the attributes of generosity, co-operation, respect, responsibility, accountability, trust, honesty etc. All these features and many
more can be found in the attribute of good living found in the institution of *ukufakwa* institution which urges humans (particularly relatives), to extend a hand of brother/sisterhood through the sharing of joys and pains for their collective good. This is what *ubuntu* is all about – to live your life selflessly and for others, who also live theirs selflessly for you, and for the world. In *ubuntu* we see rules of good living. Apply them also in respect of *isondlo, ukungena, ukwethula, mafisa/sisa/ nqoma*.

**Assignment 03**

**Section A The requirements for a valid customary marriage:**

Apply the provisions of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998 regarding the requirements for a valid customary marriage to test the validity of the following judgments.

(Remember to start case discussion properly by giving the names of the parties; the legal question that was answered by the court, the reasons for judgment (*ratio decidendi*) given by the court and the decision of the court).

**(a) The names of the parties**

*Mthembu v Letsela and Another* 1997 (2) SA 936 (T)

*Mthembu v Letsela and Another* 1998 (2) SA 675 (T)

*Mthembu v Letsela and Another* 2000 (3) SA 867 (SCA)
Introduction


In November 1996, Le Roux J heard an application by the applicant, Mildred Hleziphi Mthembu, who approached the court for relief in a matter of succession to the estate of her deceased husband, one Tebalo Watson Letsela, to whom she claimed to have been married by customary law.

The legal question that was answered by the court

The applicant sought the following relief:

1. An order declaring
   1.1. that the rule of African customary law which generally excludes African women from intestate succession ("the customary law rule") is inconsistent with the Constitution and consequently invalid;
   1.2. that s 23 of the Black Administration Act 38 of 1927 ("the Act") and s 2 of the Regulations for the Administration and Distribution of the Estates of Deceased Blacks made under s 23(10) of the Act [and published] by Government Notice R200 of 6 February 1987 ("the regulations") are invalid insofar as they demand the application of the customary law rule;
   1.3. that the administration and distribution of the estate of her late husband, Tebalo Watson Letsela ("the deceased") is governed by the common law of intestate succession; and
   1.4. that Tembi Mtembu is the deceased's only intestate heir.

Mthembu v Letsela and Another 1997 (2) SA 936 (T)

Before his death Letsela (the deceased) was employed in Boksburg and owned a house at 822 Ditopi Street, Vosloorus, in which he had lived with the applicant (the widow) since 1990, together with their daughter, Tembi, who was born on 7 April 1988. In the same house also lived Letsela's parents, his sister and her daughter.
The deceased died on 13 August 1993 and the first respondent, Henry K Letsela, (father of the deceased) was appointed by the second respondent (the Magistrate, Boksburg) to administer and wind up the estate. He claims that the house in Ditopi Street devolves upon him according to the rules of customary law. The rules are recognized by s 23 of the Black Administration Act 38 of 1927 and the regulations made under the authority of the Act, especially reg 2 of 6 February 1987 promulgated in Government Gazette 10601 as Government Notice (5) R200. This regulation provides for customary law to apply to the devolution of the estate of a black person who dies intestate. The most important customary law rule is the one of male primogeniture in the customary law of succession in terms of which only first-born or precedent males may inherit in cases of intestacy, to the exclusion of females and junior males.

First respondent claimed that he has no responsibilities toward applicant, either to house her or to maintain her and her daughter; denied the existence of a customary marriage between the applicant and his son and rejected any suggestion that the applicant and her daughter were part of his family. In her reply, the applicant produced witnesses and documents to prove the existence of a valid customary marriage between herself and the deceased, including the information that lobolo was formally fixed at R2,000 and that by the time of his death, her deceased husband had paid R900 towards this sum.

The first respondent relied mainly on the argument that there was no valid customary marriage between his son and the applicant and that consequently she neither has any rights as a wife in this matter nor does he owe her and her daughter any obligations.
The decision and reasons for judgment

The court found that the customary law rule excluding women from inheritance is *prima facie* discriminatory on the grounds of sex or gender but not unfairly so because of the concomitant duty of support. Mindful that the constitutional issue (unfairly discriminatory on the grounds of sex or gender) might assume a different complexion if the facts revealed that there had been no customary marriage between applicant and deceased, Le Roux J realized that the concomitant duty of support would cease to be a consideration and the investigation into the constitutionality of the rule would have to take different factors into account. The court accordingly referred the matter for the hearing of oral evidence on: (a) whether there was a valid customary marriage between the applicant and the deceased; or (b) whether a putative marriage under customary law existed between them.

Mthembu v. Letsela and Another 1998 (2) SA675 (T)

The legal question that was answered by the court:

Whether a customary marriage existed between Mthembu (applicant) and Letsela (deceased) and whether Tembi (daughter) was a legitimate child

The hearing of oral evidence took place in August 1997 in a case presided over by Mynhardt J. Neither the applicant nor the first respondent adduced any evidence and the application was accordingly determined on the basis that no customary marriage existed between Mthembu and the deceased and that Tembi was therefore illegitimate.

On the question of the court 'developing' customary law in line with the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Right, applicant's counsel made a strong case for customary law to be coaxed towards equality, which is a value fundamental to the Constitution.

Arguing that the issue of discrimination on the grounds of sex or gender is 'academic' in this case because the real reason for Tembi's disqualification from inheritance is her illegitimacy, the Court refused to 'develop' customary law in the direction suggested.
The reasons for judgment

“In the present case I therefore decline the invitation to develop the customary law of succession which excludes women from participating in intestacy and which also excludes children who are not the oldest male child. In any event, because the development of that rule, as proposed by Mr Trengrove, would affect not only the customary law of succession but also the customary family law rules, I think that such development should rather be undertaken by Parliament.

The decision of the court

The Court dismisses the application with costs, and grants leave to appeal.

*Mthembu v Letsela and Another 2000 (3) SA 867 (SCA)*

The legal question that was answered by the court:

An appeal against the decision of Mynhart J who dismissed the application to declare that a customary marriage existed between applicant and the deceased and declared that Tembi was a legitimate child

Justices of Appeal Smalberger, Marais, Zulman and Mpati, and Acting Justice of Appeal Mthiyane heard the appeal on 4 May 2000 in the Supreme Court of Appeal. Counsel for the appellant raised the same four grounds of attack against the customary law rule of male primogeniture which had been dismissed by Mynhardt J in the court a quo. He stated, however, that he would not advance oral argument in respect of the first two grounds and would instead concentrate on the last two grounds which were based on the proposition that:

1. Tembi would have succeeded by intestate succession at customary law to her deceased father’s estate but for the fact that she is female, and that

2. the customary law rule of primogeniture is offensive to public policy or natural justice (within the meaning of s 1(1) of the Law Evidence Amendment Act, 1988).
The reasons for judgment

The Court dismissed both arguments and went on to consider the invitation to develop customary law according to the ‘spirit, purport and objects’ of the Bill of Rights. On this point, counsel for the appellant had argued that the customary law rule was based on ‘inequity, arbitrariness, intolerance and inequality,’ all of which are repugnant to the new constitutional order. The Court was urged to develop the rule so that it sheds its discriminatory elements and allows male and females, legitimate and illegitimate, descendants to inherit.

The court was not convinced, arguing that Tembi was excluded by illegitimacy not gender and that it was undesirable to pronounce on such an important constitutional question in a case in which the issue was academic.

The decision of the court

The appeal was dismissed on all four grounds.

Own comment on customary values and the Constitution

The place of this case in history is assured for the simple reason that it fielded the first salvo in what was to become a sustained battle against the primogeniture rule which was to culminate in the case of Bhe. Several points about the Mthembu cases are worth noting.

i. Some of the earliest criticisms of the outcome in Mthembu were based on concerns that the court did not give enough weight to the distinction between official customary law, on the one hand, and day-to-day community practice, on the other. At the time, under attack was the conclusion of Le Roux J that the concomitant duty of support attaching to the heir’s right to take all the property to the exclusion of girls and women had the effect of ‘saving’ the customary law rule from constitutional attack. This was because the duty of support rendered the discrimination not to be unfair.

This criticism is justified but the point usually overlooked is the impact of the approach of the court. In deciding to assess an African customary practice on its own merits without assuming its inferiority to some other
“mainstream” notions of propriety, the court sent a strong signal about the future of customary law in a constitutional dispensation.

ii. The failure to recognise the existence of a marriage between Hleziphi Mthembu and the deceased was another lost opportunity – this time to force the issue of the existence of a marriage so as to ensure the centrality of the real constitutional issue, sex and gender, as opposed to illegitimacy. The point could have been canvassed more forcefully, with a fair chance of success.

One must always be mindful of that important truism in customary law: ‘African customary marriage is a process, not an event’. According to many systems of customary law a relationship between a man and a woman ‘ripen’ towards marriage on the occurrence of a number of events, formal and informal, intended or inadvertent, and the reaction of the couple’s families to those events. Among the events and occurrences are: discussions about lobolo, delivery of marriage goods, cohabitation, pregnancy or the birth of a child.

All these fundamentals exist in the case of the applicant and the deceased. The crisp legal question then becomes: “what is the applicable legal system and, according to that legal system, do these fundamentals constitute a valid customary marriage?” The judgement in the first Mthembu hearing reveals that the applicant is Zulu and the deceased was of South Sotho stock. It would have been worth exploring the rules in these two systems to see whether a valid customary marriage comes into existence, in either system, in the circumstances set out above, despite the protestations of the first respondent. As things have turned out, a feeling persists that a potentially fruitful avenue in inquiry has been blocked by (or surrendered to) the first respondent, who had the clearest material motive for denying the existence of the marriage.

iii. *Maluleke v Minister of Home Affairs* Case no 02/24921 [2008] ZAGPHC 129 (9 April 2008) (unreported), The court held:
Once it is clear that the negotiations have taken place, the next inquiry, applying the Act is whether there are any factors that show that the marriage was “entered into” or “celebrated”.

The validity of a customary marriage was impuned on the basis that the traditional imvume ritual, the Zulu variation of ukumekeza (Swazi), for integrating the bride into the groom’s family, had not been observed before the death of the husband. Tshiqi J examined the requirements for a valid customary marriage as laid down in section 3 of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act.

On the basis of these requirements the judge concluded that customary marriage has evolved over the years, and that this evolution has been accepted by the South African courts. The judge then rejected the pre-transformation “official” version of customary law which held that the non-observance of the imvume ritual was fatal to the validity of a customary marriage. The judge accordingly approved the validity of the customary marriage, confirming the bride’s averment that the imvume practice was not an essential requirement for the validity of her customary marriage.

The case of Motsoatsoa v Roro All SA 324 (GSJ) is important for emphasising the value of integration of the bride to mark the transfer from one family to another. The case is important for understanding the meaning of ‘entered into’ or celebrated in section 3(1)(b) of the Act. What was in issue here was lack of handing over of the bride. The question was: can the woman hand herself over? Fanti v Boto and Others 2008 (5) SA 405 (C) also does the same thing but focuses on the importance of involvement of the two families in the formation of the customary marriage. The question was: can the husband decide, without the involvement of his in-laws, that their daughter is now his wife?

Ngwenyama v Mayelane 2012(10) BCLR 1071 (SCA) and Mayelane v Ngwenyama and Another 2013 (8) BCLR 918 (CC)
The legal question that was answered by the court:

i. whether Section 7(6) of the RCMA did indeed introduce a new requirement of validity by requiring the husband to seek his first wife’s consent;

ii. if not, whether such consent was required in Xitsonga customary law; and

iii. whether, if such consent had not been furnished, the court ought to develop the customary law to insert this requirement.

The issue was the interpretation of section 7(6) of the RCMA: whether, in requiring a husband who wants to marry another wife to make certain proprietary arrangements it introduces (by the back door, as it were) another requirement for the validity of a customary marriage.

Ms Mayelane and Ms Ngwenyama both claimed to be married by Xitsonga customary law to one Mr Moyana, now deceased. After Mr Moyana’s death Ms Mayelane, the first wife, challenged the validity of Ms Ngwenyama’s marriage on the ground that the RCMA required a husband to obtain the consent of his first wife to contract a valid further customary marriage, and that Mr Moyana had not obtained such consent.

The High Court found the Mr Moyana’s further marriage to Ngwenyama to be invalid for not complying with section 7(6) of the Recognition Act. It left the matter of the requirement of the first wife’s consent undecided. Ngwenyama appealed to the SCA.

*Ngwenyama v Mayelane* 2012 (10) BCLR 1071 (SCA)

The court heard an appeal from the decision of the high court that declared Ngwenyama’s marriage to her deceased husband invalid because the latter did not apply to court to get its approval for the contract regulating the matrimonial property of the spouses before marrying her as the second wife in terms of section 7(6) of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998.
The SCA looked at the question before court as to whether a further marriage such as Ngwenyama’s that was negotiated, entered into or celebrated without a prior court approval of a section 7(6) contract was valid or not.

The SCA’s approach was to examine the provisions of section 7(6) of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998 to establish whether their non-observance could have had a bearing on the validity of a customary marriage at all. This was in view of the fact that ordinarily the validity of the customary marriage is regulated by section 3 of the Act; and section 7(6) regulates regimes of matrimonial property only.

The reasons for judgment

The SCA, per Ndita AJA, concluded that section 7(6) of the Recognition Act was only concerned with matters of matrimonial property, and had nothing to do with the validity of the customary marriage which was regulated by section 3 of the Act. The SCA held accordingly that the non-observance of the section 7(6) did not affect the validity of the customary marriage. At most, such non-observance left the customary marriage out of community of property. According to the SCA the purpose of the Recognition Act is to protect all women, not just a particular woman. The SCA did not find it necessary to determine whether the consent of Mayelane, as the deceased’s first wife was required for the validity of Ngwenyama’s marriage to the same husband.

The decision of the court

The court upheld the appeal.

Own comment on customary values and the Constitution

The SCA’s determination that the non-observance of the provisions of section 7(6) of the Recognition Act does not affect the validity of the customary marriage is to be commended as such matters are clearly dealt with by the provisions of section 3. Consequently it held that the marriage of Ngwenyama to her deceased husband was valid despite the non-observance of the provisions of section 7(6) Recognition Act. It emphasised that the purpose of the Recognition Act is to protect all wives, not just the first wife. As there was no suggestion that section 3 Recognition Act which deals with issues of validity was not complied with, there was no basis for invalidating the marriage.
However, the SCA’s refusal to inquire into the impact of the lack of the first wife’s consent to her husband’s further marriage to another woman is to be lamented because the high court had already found that lack of such consent was problematic. The SCA therefore erred in holding that because the validity of Ngwenyama’s marriage was not invalidated by the deceased’s failure to comply with the section 7(6) provisions, it was therefore not necessary to investigate the role of the first wife’s consent.

*Mayelane v Ngwenyama 2013 (8) BCLR 918 (CC)*

The legal question that was answered by the court:

Mayelane appealed to the Constitutional Court against the decision of the SCA.

The reasons for judgment

The Constitutional Court found it necessary to investigate whether the relevant Xitsonga custom allowed the deceased to marry Ngwenyama as a second wife without first obtaining the consent of his first wife, Mayelane. The court’s approach was to collect affidavits from the community about the need for the husband to obtain his first wife’s consent to her husband’s further marriage to another woman. The court’s majority held that the Recognition Act did not contain a requirement for the first wife’s consent and that Xitsonga customary law did not have a uniform rule in this regard. The court decided in these circumstances to develop Xitsonga customary law to include the rule that the first wife’s consent to her husband’s further marriage to another woman is a requirement for the validity of a further marriage. The consequence was that non-compliance with the rule would result in the attempted subsequent marriage being invalid. Unfortunately the court, in the absence of a uniform customary law rule on consent, chose the one requiring consent, not the other. Having done that the Constitutional Court developed the version of Xitsonga customary law it favoured and gave it the stamp of the Constitution.
The decision of the court

Accordingly, the Constitutional Court, per Fronemann J, upheld the appeal, concluding that Ngwenyama's marriage to her deceased husband was invalid since it was irregularly entered into without the necessary consent of the first wife.

Own comment on customary values and the Constitution

The minority judgments of Zondo J and Jafta J are instructive in assessing the performance of the Constitutional Court’s majority decision in this matter. Both justices take issue with Formann J’s approach in taking a lot pains collecting evidence to prove what was already clearly established on record. According to Jafta J Mayelane’s evidence that her deceased husband never sought and obtained consent to marry Ngwenyama was never refuted by the latter. Formann J should therefore have accepted this fact as established, instead of calling for further evidence. Lacking consent, which is necessary according to the particular community’s tradition in terms of the unrefuted evidence, means that the subsequent marriage was not negotiated and entered into or celebrated in the manner required by custom.

Section B The development of the Customary law of Succession

Apply the provisions of the Reform of the Customary Law of Succession and Regulation of Related Matters Act 11 of 2009 to test the validity of the following judgments

(Remember to start case discussions properly by giving the names of the parties; the legal question that was answered by the court, the reasons for judgment (ratio decidendi) given by the court and the decision of the court).

(a) Mthembu v Letsela and Another 1997 (2) SA 936 (T), Mthembu v Letsela and Another 1998 (2) SA 675 (T) and Mthembu v Letsela and Another 2000 (3) SA 867 (SCA). See section A above.

(b) Bhe cases (Bhe v The Magistrate Khayelitsha 1998 (3) 2004 (1) BCLR 27 (C), Bhe v The Magistrate Khayelitsha; Shibi v Sithole; Human Rights
The legal question that was answered by the court

Philila Shilubana, of the Valoyi traditional community, in the Limpopo Province of South Africa, was not appointed as a traditional leader (hosi) of her people when her father died in 1968. As a woman she could not be appointed due to the laws of unfair discrimination at the time. Instead her father’s brother, Richard Nwamitwa, was appointed as the traditional leader (hosi). When the latter died in 2001, the Valoyi Traditional Authority took a resolution to appoint Philila Shilubana as the traditional leader (hosi) relying on the constitutional provision for gender equality which motivated the community to adapt its rules. This resolution amended the past practice of the community which indicated the eldest son of the previous hosi as the successor to his father as the new traditional leader (hosi). Sidwell Nwamitwa, Richard Nwamitwa’s son, sought to dispute Philila Shilubana’s appointment, relying on past practice based on his purported right as the eldest son of the previous hosi.

The decision of the court

The matter was decided in favour of Sidwell Nwamitwa in both the High Court and the SCA, in terms of the community’s past practice.

Shilubana v Nwamitwa 2008 (9) BCLR 914 (CC)

The legal question that was answered by the court

The case was eventually taken on appeal to the Constitutional Court.

The decision of the court and reasons for judgment

In a unanimous judgment, the Court decided that Ms Shilubana was legally appointed as the legitimate traditional leader (hosi) of the Valoyi people. The Court emphasised the fact that customary law is a living system of law. As such it was not bound by
historical precedent. Its flexibility allowed it to evolve as its community changed. Once it was clear that the contemporary practices of the community have replaced its past practices, the latter no longer applied.

Because of this, the Constitutional Court deviated from prior decisions that had served as a test for determining the content of customary law even though they indicated long-standing and historical practices. Instead the Court redefined customary law as a system that reflected the current practices of the particular community. Living customary law came to be defined with reference to the constantly evolving practices that indicate the current system of norms by which that community has chosen to live.

The Constitutional Court held that the customary law regarding the appointment of a traditional leader (hosi) had legitimately evolved to allow for the appointment of a woman as a traditional leader (hosi) and that this development was consistent with the Constitution. After finding that Philia Shilubana had been validly appointed the Constitutional Court upheld the appeal, thus confirming her appointment as a traditional leader (hosi) of her Valoyi community.

Bear in mind that this was after this particular community (Valoyi community) had decided to adapt its laws consistently with the Constitution. Other communities will be judged according to their own contemporary practices.

**Own comment on customary law values and the Constitution**

The Constitutional Court very well endorsed the community’s right to develop their law, thus protecting their right to develop their culture. In doing so the court unfortunately destroyed the rule regulating the customary law of succession from one generation to another. The Constitutional Court ignored that according to customary law, lineage is important and that the position of successor must be held by someone capable of producing a future Nwamitwa heir. In appointing Philia, the court should not have left future succession hanging. It should have made it clear that it was doing so because of her status as a princess, and add that in order to uphold lineage of the Nwamitwa royal line, after her death the position would revert to a qualifying Nwamitwa
prince/princess. Therefore, the court did a good thing (promoting gender equality) and (not so good as it failed to promote culture).

Section C The development of living customary law under the Constitution

Apply the evolving principles in post-apartheid customary law
(Remember to start case discussion properly by giving the names of the parties; the legal question that was answered by the court, the reasons for judgment (ratio decidendi) given by the court and the decision of the court).

*Mabuza v Mbatha* 2003 (7) BCLR 43 (C) *Mabena v Letsoalo* 1998 (2) SA 1068 (T)

These two cases are about how the courts have negotiated the transition from the old order to the present. *Mabuza* demonstrates the transition from a society that defined customary marriage with reference to the elaborate *ukumekeza* tradition that was best suited to the previous rural set-up, and that it is no longer necessary in the current urban conditions. *Mabena* is about how independent and adult youths have been empowered to negotiate their own customary marriages; and that the involvement of their fathers is no longer essential for this purpose. As the law lived by communities in actual current social practice, living law endorsed after the court looked at the current situation in the country. These cases can also illustrate the extent of transformation in the law of marriage as well, especially the issue of validity. See also *Maluleke v Minister of Home Affairs* Case no 02/24921 [2008] ZAGPHC 129 (9 April 2008) (unreported) where the court held that even though the integration of the bride might not have been observed, but the spouses themselves showed by the way they related to each other that they accepted that they were husband and wife. Therefore, in a difficult case, where, after the negotiations have been completed, the requirements of "entered into or celebrated" cannot be proved, the behaviour of the spouses towards each other becomes important.

*Alexkor Ltd and Another v Richtersveld Community and Others* 2003 (12) BCLR 1301 (CC) is proof that customary law and common law are equal components of South African law and the time when customary law was viewed with reference to common law was over. The current status of customary law is that of an original and independent system that has its own values and norms.

*Shilubana and Others v Nwamitwa* 2008 (9) BCLR 914 (CC) is authority for
ascertaining the applicable customary law. You find it by looking at the community’s past practice, which is their customary law. Past practice continues to apply until it is clear that such practice has changed. In the latter event one must look at the current social practice to find the applicable customary law. It is also important to note that section 211(2) of the Constitution empowers communities to make and amend their laws. In *Shilubana* this was done by an amendment in which the community aligned their law with Constitution, making females equal to males for the purposes of appointment to traditional leadership positions.

*Bhe v The Magistrate Khayelitsha; Shibi v Sithole; Human Rights Commission v President of Republic of South Africa 2005 (1) BCLR 580 (CC)* is authority for jettisoning the discredited apartheid rule entrenched in section 23 of the Black Administration Act (BAA), which preferred males to females in matters of succession. As a result, section 23 of the BAA, the principle of male primogeniture; the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate children were all declared unconstitutional and removed from customary law. The court went on to incorporate the provisions of the Intestate Succession Act, 81 of 1987, dealing with child portions. After making the necessary adjustments, all the children of the deceased, legitimate and illegitimate, together with all his widows/widowers must get child portions. Textbook pages 173-182

Understanding customary law in its post-transformation state and contrast it with its pre-transformation state.

The following quotation shows you how to describe post-apartheid customary law:

*Pilane and Another v Pilane and Others 2013 (4) BCLR 431 (CC) paras 34-35*

it is well established that customary law is a vital component of our constitutional system, recognised and protected by the Constitution, while ultimately subject to its terms. The true nature of customary law is as a living body of law, active and dynamic, with an inherent capacity to evolve in keeping with the changing lives of the people whom it governs.

On this basis the court held that the traditional authority cannot deny constitutional rights/freedoms to members of the community who wish to enjoy/ exercise them
You must compare the above with the following quotation from pre-recognition customary law:

Section 1(1) of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act, 45 of 1988

any court may take judicial notice of the law of a foreign state and of indigenous law in so far as such law can be ascertained readily and with sufficient certainty: Provided that indigenous law shall not be opposed to the principles of public policy or natural justice.

What is the difference? – the first quotation emphasises a customary law that is recognised and protected by the Constitution – that is living, active and dynamic, and part of the lives of the people; and - the second quotation merely refers to taking of judicial notice, not recognition; it puts customary law at the level of foreign law, as opposed to a vital component of our constitutional system; it requires customary law to be proved before being used (ie ascertained readily and with sufficient certainty), as opposed to being applies as in section 211(3) of the Constitution. Lastly, and most importantly, pre-recognition customary law was used, not as of right, but subject to a condition, namely: Provided that indigenous law shall not be opposed to the principles of public policy or natural justice. In other words, there was a suspicion that indigenous law might be contrary to good morals if used unchecked. When you notice that the italicised phrases were never used in describing the common law you will realise that these two components of South African law were never treated with equality in the past.
Section D The indigenous normative values of customary law found in concepts such as *ukufakwa*, *isondo* and others that indicate the centrality of *ubuntu* in African traditions. See Textbook pages 188-194; the study guide pages 81-84; For model answers see question 4 of assignment 2 above.

Question 2

(d) *Nwamitwa v Philia and Others* 2005 (3) SA 536 (T); *Shilubana cases* (*Shilubana and Others v Nwamitwa* 2007 (2) SA 432 (SCA) and *Shilubana and Others v Nwamitwa* 2008 (9) BCLR 914 (CC).

The legal question that was answered by the court

Philia Shilubana, of the Valoyi traditional community, in the Limpopo Province of South Africa, was not appointed as a traditional leader (hosi) of her people when her father died in 1968. As a woman she could not be appointed due to the laws of unfair discrimination at the time. Instead her father’s brother, Richard Nwamitwa, was appointed as the traditional leader (hosi). When the latter died in 2001, the Valoyi Traditional Authority took a resolution to appoint Philia Shilubana as the traditional leader (hosi) relying on the constitutional provision for gender equality which motivated the community to adapt its rules. This resolution amended the past practice of the community which indicated the eldest son of the previous hosi as the successor to his father as the new traditional leader (hosi). Sidwell Nwamitwa, Richard Nwamitwa’s son, sought to dispute Philia Shilubana's appointment, relying on past practice based on his purported right as the eldest son of the previous hosi.

The decision of the court

The matter was decided in favour of Sidwell Nwamitwa in both the High Court and the SCA, in terms of the community’s past practice.

*Shilubana v Nwamitwa* 2008 (9) BCLR 914 (CC)

The legal question that was answered by the court

The case was eventually taken on appeal to the Constitutional Court.
The decision of the court and reasons for judgment

In a unanimous judgment, the Court decided that Ms Shilubana was legally appointed as the legitimate traditional leader (hosi) of the Valoyi people. The Court emphasised the fact that customary law is a living system of law. As such it was not bound by historical precedent. Its flexibility allowed it to evolve as its community changed. Once it was clear that the contemporary practices of the community have replaced its past practices, the latter no longer applied.

Because of this, the Constitutional Court deviated from prior decisions that had served as a test for determining the content of customary law even though they indicated long-standing and historical practices. Instead the Court redefined customary law as a system that reflected the current practices of the particular community. Living customary law came to be defined with reference to the constantly evolving practices that indicate the current system of norms by which that community has chosen to live.

The Constitutional Court held that the customary law regarding the appointment of a traditional leader (hosi) had legitimately evolved to allow for the appointment of a woman as a traditional leader (hosi) and that this development was consistent with the Constitution. After finding that Philia Shilubana had been validly appointed the Constitutional Court upheld the appeal, thus confirming her appointment as a traditional leader (hosi) of her Valoyi community.

Bear in mind that this was after this particular community (Valoyi community) had decided to adapt its laws consistently with the Constitution. Other communities will be judged according to their own contemporary practices.

Own comment on customary law values and the Constitution

The Constitutional Court very well endorsed the community’s right to develop their law, thus protecting their right to develop their culture. In doing so the court unfortunately destroyed the rule regulating the customary law of succession from one generation to another. The Constitutional Court ignored that according to customary law, lineage is important and that the position of successor must be held by someone capable of producing a future Nwamitwa heir. In appointing Philia, the court should not have left
future succession hanging. It should have made it clear that it was doing so because of her status as a princess, and add that in order to uphold lineage of the Nwamitwa royal line, after her death the position would revert to a qualifying Nwamitwa prince/princess. Therefore, the court did a good thing (promoting gender equality) and (not so good as it failed to promote culture).

**Question 3**

The transformative role of the following post-apartheid statutes in the development of customary law:

(a) **Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998**

Before the Act came into being customary marriage was not recognised as a marriage in law. It was known as a customary union where spouses did not enjoy marital rights. Black women were perpetual minors who could be discarded simply by their husbands marrying other women by civil rites.

The Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998 has its origins in the recognition of customary law by the Constitution. The advent of the Act brought legal recognition to this institution, which became a customary marriage, instead of customary union, with full legal recognition to the same level as the civil marriage. Under the Act husband and wife are equal, multiple wives are recognised and the marriage can be registered; and can be dissolved only by a court. Thus the South African family law became normalised, humanised, modernised or improved as all marriage systems attained legal equality.

(b) **Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act 41 of 2003 as amended by Act 23 of 2009.**

Again the Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act 41 of 2003 has its origins in the recognition of customary law by the Constitution. Prior to the constitutional changes the traditional leaders were not given their proper status. They were called chiefs, not Traditional Leaders and were given functions to do as apartheid stooges, who were paid to enforce oppressive statutes against their own people in exchange for some stipend.
The advent of Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act 41 of 2003 ushered in an era of democratic traditions for the appointment of traditional leaders, who are now free to be addressed by their traditional titles (iNkosi Buthelezi, Nkosi Holomisa, Kgosi Pilane), and no longer insulted as ‘chief’. The Act provides for the appointment of women as traditional leaders where necessary to enhance gender representativity. Traditional Leaders are no longer chosen by the ‘State president as the Supreme Chief of all natives’, but are identified by the royal family for appointment by the government, to reduce the danger of appointing government stooges.

(c) The Reform of Customary Law of Succession and Regulation of Related Matters Act 11 of 2009.

The recognition of customary law by the Constitution meant that the Bill of Right had to be respected in the sphere of succession. The discredited principle of male primogeniture, which preferred senior males over women and junior males, had to go. The Act implemented the judgment of Bhe v Magistrate Khayelitsha, which abolished discrimination on the basis of race, gender, marital status, birth, age etc for the purposes of succession. The Act imported The Intestate Succession Act into customary law to introduce inheritance by child portions for sharing by the deceases wife or wives, children, legitimate or not etc.
3. FORMAT OF THE OCT/NOV 2018 EXAMINATION

The 2018 Oct/Nov examination will be a **Two-hour** examination paper. The paper consists of a total of 100 marks.

NOTE: PREPARING FOR THE EXAMINATION

Study all the prescribed tutorial matter and do not “spot”. Therefore you must study all sections of the work. Note the following:

**In order to pass the Examinations:**

1. Study the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act, 120 of 1998; Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act, 41 of 2003; and the Reform of customary Law of Succession and Regulation of Related Matters Act 11 of 2009. What is important is to be able to demonstrate the transformation these Acts brought about in the sphere of customary law.

2. Find the cases/sources from which all the extracts/quotes in Assignment 1 come from, not just those that were chosen as the right answers for the assignment.

3. Study Tutorial Letter 201/2/2012 and Revise your assignments, especially the solutions to Assignment 02 (above) and Assignment 03 (below).

4. Use Assignments 02 and 03 as models for answering the examination questions.

5. When preparing for the examination please make sure that you take particular note of the feedback to Assignments 02 and 03 above.