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# The Consequences of Apartheid

By GWENDOLEN M. CARTER

IN considering the consequences of *apartheid* it is important to know what type of *apartheid* we are speaking about. There are, in fact, three, or even perhaps four, kinds of *apartheid*. There is the traditional type, which has always been characteristic of South African society and is often spoken of as traditional racial segregation. Building on this traditional type but with a new form because of its embodiment in legal enactment and the much greater precision of its definition is the type of *apartheid* established by the Nationalists since 1948. This type goes beyond the customary rules of racial segregation in South Africa—to sharpen them in different areas, to make them more logical, and to give them an over-all ideological slant. Beyond this again is a third type, the type that we call “ideal” or “total” *apartheid*, which has at its base the notion of two geographically separate societies, a white society and a black society. And it is this latter, long-range objective which has often been used as the rationale for the measures undertaken by the Nationalists.

If I speak of a fourth type of *apartheid*, it is the one embodied in the Tomlinson Report presented to Parliament shortly before its recess for Easter. This report is the result of a vast investigation, undertaken under the chairmanship of Professor Tomlinson, into the socioeconomic conditions of the reserves. Its proposals come closer to the notion of ideal, or total, *apartheid* than has any other plan which has been advanced as a practical scheme. They involve the establishment of a genuine national home for the Bantu, in the present reserves of South Africa, to which

are to be joined, say the Tomlinson Commission hopefully, the colonies and protectorates known as the High Commission Territories—Basutoland, Swaziland, and Bechuanaland. In suggesting that these areas be added to the present South African native reserves in order to make a reasonably large area for a future “Bantustan,” the Report does not mention, however, the strong public opinion in the United Kingdom against ceding these territories to South Africa, particularly so long as the latter country maintains the Nationalist type of *apartheid*.

The distinction between the first two and latter two types of *apartheid* is very wide indeed. The Ambassador has told you that *apartheid* is the traditional way of separating Europeans from non-Europeans in a society in which they have become increasingly intermingled as the result of economic development. That development is constantly drawing Africans in from the reserves to fill the new opportunities presented by the economy. But those Africans are also coming off the reserves because these no longer provide them with even a precarious subsistence. Part of the task of the Tomlinson Commission was to see what could be done with the reserves to make them more productive. As far as agriculture is concerned, the Commission found that only half the present number of peasant African farmers can make a living within these reserves. In effect, although today more than one-half of all South Africa’s nine million Africans are outside the reserves at any given time, a further half of those still in the reserves, that is about two million Africans, cannot secure a

livelihood from agriculture there. Thus a real economic revolution would be necessary if the reserves are to provide subsistence not only for their present population but for a substantial proportion of those now outside their boundaries; and another revolution would also occur, perhaps more gradually, if African labor should be withdrawn progressively from the European economy. If it is not so withdrawn, the problem is that these people, who provide the great unskilled labor force of South Africa, will all be on the plane of migratory labor, with everything that expression implies in terms of the disintegration of tribal structure, of traditional discipline, and of family solidarity.

#### COST OF APARTHEID

Let us now consider the consequences of *apartheid* not in moral terms but in terms of what *apartheid* actually costs the South African community. Even traditional *apartheid*, the most moderate though still far-ranging type of racial segregation, means an extraordinary proliferation of separate facilities: schools, buses, railway carriages, separate entrances, and so forth. In the Cape there are even separate telephone boxes in certain places for the use of non-Europeans. Some of these separate facilities may be essential in terms of public health so long as so many Africans are relatively primitive, but many of the separate facilities are being added today because of ideology rather than need.

Beyond the actual cost of providing additional facilities is the wastage of not using fully the economic resource represented in the labor of the increasingly skilled African. In many instances the African may not yet be sufficiently well trained to assume all the responsibilities of the economic process, but anyone who has been to South Africa will realize that there are many skilled

jobs which Africans can increasingly assume, and in fact are assuming, in some of the newer industries like cotton manufacturing, though they are rated as unskilled or semiskilled. One of South Africa's greatest problems today is that it has one of the smallest proportions of skilled labor—in fact, I believe, the smallest proportion—of any industrial economy in the world. Greater mobility to use the skill which is available would have an excellent effect upon the operation of the South African economy.

#### ENGLISH SOUTH AFRICANS

Perhaps this *apartheid* might be worth while, despite the cost that it involves and the restraints on economic mobility, if in practice it were solving the problems of human relations in this highly complex racial situation. But in fact is it? On the contrary, everything that I can see indicates that it is causing fresh racial tension, not only between European and non-European but also between the European groups. Nothing has disturbed English-speaking and some Afrikaans-speaking South Africans so much as the efforts which the Nationalists have made to remove the Colored from the common roll, and thus eliminate the last non-Europeans to cast their votes side by side with Europeans. The earlier expedients may have seemed justified to the Nationalists by what they felt were the provisions of the Statute of Westminster, though the Appeal Court declared them unconstitutional. But when the Nationalists pushed through the 1955 Senate Act, they changed the balance of the Constitution solely to achieve this particular purpose. As a result, we have the new Black Sash Movement as the counterpart to the earlier Torch Commando, both of them signaling the intense distress of the Opposition and, in particular, of English-speaking South Africans at what they consider to be a

violation of the Constitution, not only the Constitution in its formal mechanistic sense but constitutionality in the broadest sense as an agreed basis of political action.

#### AFRICAN NATIONALISM

There is today very little indication of non-European resistance in South Africa. I find it hard to believe, however, that absence of resistance indicates general satisfaction with what is going on. I remember keenly the passive resistance campaign of 1952. I realized that it petered out, partly for lack of funds, partly because of harsher penalties, but I cannot believe that the deep sense of bitterness which underlay it has lessened to any appreciable degree. Perhaps the only way to transform African nationalism from its present bitter, frustrated form of demanding a fuller share of the returns of the European community would be, apart from satisfying this demand, to assure the Africans that they are indeed to have a home of their own, in which they can have self-development as West Africans now have. This, I realize, is the ultimate objective of ideal *apartheid* and, to a lesser degree, of the kind of program which the Tomlinson Commission has proposed. Only a program so far-reaching in its possibilities could produce a reversal of the economic integration which is the result of present economic developments, and could thus divert the African nationalist aspirations which represent so ultimately explosive a force in South Africa.

#### IS TOMLINSON APARTHEID PRACTICABLE?

Is it then complete or total *apartheid*, or even the very substantial territorial *apartheid* of the Tomlinson Report, which offers the best hope in South Africa? Even if this is the case, is Tomlinson *apartheid* practicable? Is there

a possibility, an economic possibility, of building the reserves into an area capable of supporting the African population? Is this program not merely leading to an intensification of the problems of migratory labor? I am not prepared to say that it is not a good and a healthy thing to build up industry in the reserves; I think it is excellent, particularly if it can command the support of the African. And even though the progress of Zwelitsha—the textile mill in a model native suburb of Kingwilliamstown, administrative center of the Ciskei native reserve—is not particularly encouraging for a belief that industry in the reserves will necessarily secure the support of the African, yet I believe this support would come in time. But when I think of the enormous expense of establishing the necessary amount of industry in the reserves I wonder where the funds are coming from. One of my American friends, after going over plans, partly those of the Tomlinson Commission and partly those which he heard from Nationalists, said that it seemed to him their implementation would need a new Marshall Plan, not so much less proportionately to the vast amounts poured by this country into the postwar development of Western Europe. But in Western Europe there were trained workers and traditional lines of industry to build upon. None of this exists in the present reserves, none of it exists in the High Commission Territories, even if these might be transferred by the British, unlikely as that is. And so, where does the money come from?

The Tomlinson Commission proposes that its program should be financed half from public funds, that is, funds raised by South African whites for the most part, and half from Africans. I find it hard to see how substantial funds can come from Africans, if we take into account their present standard of living.

Moreover, I find it hard to believe that white South Africans are going to contribute the vast amount necessary to provide even half from public funds. It is said today that one of the major sources of discontent within the Nationalist party is over using so much white South African money for the aid of the African. Thus there seems little chance that a program of total *apartheid*, or even of Tomlinson *apartheid*, will be tried as an answer to the situation.<sup>1</sup>

What have I ended with? On the one hand, I have said, and I believe, that to move wholeheartedly towards the program outlined by Professor Tomlinson's Commission would offer an opportunity for better relations between Europeans and non-Europeans. My doubts are not about the program as such but about the possibility of carrying it out. Yet to be constructive the program must be carried out in full. If the program is carried out only in

<sup>1</sup> The South African government in its White Paper, issued after this article had been presented, accepted the findings of the Tomlinson Commission as a basis for future policy decisions. The Commission recommended a ten-year plan involving the expenditure of \$290,000,000 for industrial and social development of the Bantu area. The White Paper neither specifically accepted nor rejected this obligation but declared that the necessary appropriation of funds would be sought annually in accordance with growing needs, the plans submitted, and the country's capacity in each phase of development to meet the costs. The White Paper specifically rejected the idea that private European industrialists be permitted to develop industries within Bantu areas and declared that "Bantu enterprise, unimpeded by European competition, should be enabled to develop its own industries." It appears, therefore, that the government will keep the direction of development in the native reserves in its own hands, stimulating it by use of public funds and, possibly, through tapping native savings. It remains to be seen how substantial a plan can be carried through under these conditions. Under any circumstances, of course, it will need to proceed slowly at first.

part, as seems to me probable, then it will do two things, both of which are likely to make relations not less but more difficult. It will place a further fear of displacement in the minds of those Africans already domiciled more or less permanently in the European areas. Moreover, it will make the South African economy still more dependent on migratory labor, which is a wasteful kind of labor because it tends to interfere with the building up of experience, tradition, and *esprit de corps*, all of which are enormously valuable in any labor force.

And what is being thrown away in the process? It seems to me that strains are being put on the white population which will intensify the bitterness between groups within that population. I do not anticipate that the Nationalist party will break asunder under such strains. It may be that in practice, if African nationalism becomes more intense, English and Afrikaner will draw closer together for mutual protection. But it is not the kind of outgoing, spontaneous, active co-operation and unity on which a sound national spirit should be based.

#### ECONOMIC INTEGRATION

There is one other answer: to welcome rather than to impede economic integration. Very few South Africans are prepared to take integration as their slogan. The Liberals have done so with vast courage, but they have relatively little support among either the Europeans or the non-Europeans. Yet the whole dynamic of the economic situation is pushing the country towards integration, not social, not residential, but economic integration. If this continues, it seems to me that the stability of the country depends on giving the non-Europeans a sense of permanence, and the

opportunities within the economic structure to which their capacities entitle them.

I do not know if there is still time in South Africa to build a community which is based on a very considerable degree of separateness but which is also unified in terms of the common economic enterprise in which all its people are joined. I do believe that the only hopeful alternatives are either some such clearly stated objective for all of South Africa's people or else a very clear op-

portunity for real separateness. The latter would mean giving the African the opportunity to develop a society of his own with political as well as economic and social rights, and a society, moreover, which is not dependent on the returns of migratory labor. Unless one or the other of these is done the consequences of *apartheid* may be a continued economic drag on the country and intensified bitterness between Europeans and non-Europeans, leading perhaps ultimately to a final break.

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